Comments on: Top-Down Management in Afghanistan http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/ A Blog by Timothy B. Lee Wed, 08 Feb 2012 02:37:33 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0.1 By: Brian Moore http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-14071 Brian Moore Sun, 27 Jun 2010 16:55:14 +0000 http://timothyblee.com/?p=3245#comment-14071 No, I certainly agree with some of his stuff, that's why I linked him; and I've certainly advocated for some of his conclusions in public forums. I think guys like him and Bill Lind are very good on a certain subset of topics, but I don't approve of everything they say, for example from his wikipedia article: "We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions, perhaps even at Rome. Most European capitals are targets for our air force…. We have the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel goes under.[4]" Things like that... are, in fact, "totally nuts," you have to agree. You can pretend that I'm trying to slander him and his ideas, when in fact I'm trying to get them a favorable hearing. No, I certainly agree with some of his stuff, that’s why I linked him; and I’ve certainly advocated for some of his conclusions in public forums. I think guys like him and Bill Lind are very good on a certain subset of topics, but I don’t approve of everything they say, for example from his wikipedia article:

“We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions, perhaps even at Rome. Most European capitals are targets for our air force…. We have the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel goes under.[4]”

Things like that… are, in fact, “totally nuts,” you have to agree. You can pretend that I’m trying to slander him and his ideas, when in fact I’m trying to get them a favorable hearing.

]]> By: Ridge Runner http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-14024 Ridge Runner Sat, 26 Jun 2010 06:55:43 +0000 http://timothyblee.com/?p=3245#comment-14024 @ Brian Moore Martin van Creveld, at least in some of his work, seems pretty sensible to me, e.g., http://mises.org/daily/527 The State: Its Rise and Decline Maybe he just sees some things more clearly than you, and you see the sharper images as "crazy" because of your unfamiliarity with them. @ Brian Moore
Martin van Creveld, at least in some of his work, seems pretty sensible to me, e.g.,
http://mises.org/daily/527
The State: Its Rise and Decline

Maybe he just sees some things more clearly than you, and you see the sharper images as “crazy” because of your unfamiliarity with them.

]]> By: Brian Moore http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-13953 Brian Moore Thu, 24 Jun 2010 18:13:04 +0000 http://timothyblee.com/?p=3245#comment-13953 In the above, I meant to put "... to be interesting" before the links. Also, here's an absolutely perfect "top-down = bad" example, from WW2: http://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htm In this vein, this guy is pretty interesting, if also totally nuts: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_van_Creveld In the above, I meant to put “… to be interesting” before the links.

Also, here’s an absolutely perfect “top-down = bad” example, from WW2:

http://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htm

In this vein, this guy is pretty interesting, if also totally nuts:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_van_Creveld

]]> By: Brian Moore http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-13952 Brian Moore Thu, 24 Jun 2010 18:07:53 +0000 http://timothyblee.com/?p=3245#comment-13952 If you're interested in something that could be described as bottom-up military strategy (while of course implementing an overall strategic directive), I've found everything below: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist) Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. New York: Little, Brown, 2002. ISBN 0-316-88146-5 and ISBN 0-316-79688-3. Biography; contains "Destruction & Creation". OODA loop maneuver warfare 4th generation warfare Unfortunately there's some crazy, stupid politics wrapped up in some of the guys associated with these ideas, but from a "bottom-up" perspective, they have a similar message: that you have to be able to react quickly, and that even with modern communications, you can't talk to your generals (or Presidents) fast enough to make the necessary decisions -- so you need to give general priorities and let subordinate officers figure out the best way to achieve them. The concept of micromanaging orders like the one you outline above would be anathema to this concept, and probably helps contribute to the reason that the marine corp seems to outperform the army in situations like this. You know, that's probably not a bad one sentence reply to "in what ways could defense policy change to allow for more bottom-up thinking throughout the different military institutions?" -- "have the army act more like the marines." If you’re interested in something that could be described as bottom-up military strategy (while of course implementing an overall strategic directive), I’ve found everything below:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)

Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. New York: Little, Brown, 2002. ISBN 0-316-88146-5 and ISBN 0-316-79688-3. Biography; contains “Destruction & Creation”.

OODA loop

maneuver warfare

4th generation warfare

Unfortunately there’s some crazy, stupid politics wrapped up in some of the guys associated with these ideas, but from a “bottom-up” perspective, they have a similar message: that you have to be able to react quickly, and that even with modern communications, you can’t talk to your generals (or Presidents) fast enough to make the necessary decisions — so you need to give general priorities and let subordinate officers figure out the best way to achieve them.

The concept of micromanaging orders like the one you outline above would be anathema to this concept, and probably helps contribute to the reason that the marine corp seems to outperform the army in situations like this. You know, that’s probably not a bad one sentence reply to “in what ways could defense policy change to allow for more bottom-up thinking throughout the different military institutions?” — “have the army act more like the marines.”

]]> By: Timothy B Lee http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-13944 Timothy B Lee Thu, 24 Jun 2010 13:53:16 +0000 http://timothyblee.com/?p=3245#comment-13944 I don't think there's anything the military can do to avoid the problems of top-down organization. We obviously wouldn't want a "bottom-up military" where mid-level commanders are free to start wars on a freelance basis. The policy conclusion I draw is that we should be a lot more careful about getting ourselves into wars in the first place, since policymakers routinely overestimate how much control they'll have over the course of the war once it's started. In this specific case, I'd like to see us get out of Afghanistan relatively soon. I don’t think there’s anything the military can do to avoid the problems of top-down organization. We obviously wouldn’t want a “bottom-up military” where mid-level commanders are free to start wars on a freelance basis. The policy conclusion I draw is that we should be a lot more careful about getting ourselves into wars in the first place, since policymakers routinely overestimate how much control they’ll have over the course of the war once it’s started. In this specific case, I’d like to see us get out of Afghanistan relatively soon.

]]> By: Rhayader http://timothyblee.com/2010/06/23/top-down-management-in-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-13940 Rhayader Thu, 24 Jun 2010 12:52:23 +0000 http://timothyblee.com/?p=3245#comment-13940 Just curious Tim -- in what ways could defense policy change to allow for more bottom-up thinking throughout the different military institutions? The limitations on central planning are clear, but what is the alternative in a military setting? The whole thing seems designed for exactly the sort of top-down organization that leads to so many problems. Just curious Tim — in what ways could defense policy change to allow for more bottom-up thinking throughout the different military institutions? The limitations on central planning are clear, but what is the alternative in a military setting? The whole thing seems designed for exactly the sort of top-down organization that leads to so many problems.

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